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Response
Serap Mahmatli
I. Introduction
Since the implosions of the socialist bloc, everyone has asked the
same question: What is next? In the early days following the collapse, it seemed as if a peaceful world based on the victory of the
capitalist West was going to emerge. Soon after, however, with
the ethnic and regional conflicts breaking out, what had been
called the “new world order” is being renamed the “new world
disorder”! Now the question is: Will there be a transformation
for a democratic world order, as Professor Sakamoto asks; or
will it be just the opposite, and we will fail?
In general, I agree with most of Professor Sakamoto’s points
and his historical analysis. The critical global problematiques
conceptualized by him as (a) peace/disparity, (b) development/democracy, (c) human rights/culture/population, and
(d) environment/democracy all appear as the major problems of
today’s world. Furthermore, I think Professor Sakamoto makes
a very important point by showing the incongruity between the
global character of the problematiques and the national character of the agents who are supposed to deal with them.
I also concur with the four fundamental developments
defined by Professor Sakamoto — the unipolar world military
order, the single capitalist global market, the universalization of
nationalism, and the globalization of democracy as the salient
features of the post – Cold War period. However, I would like to
add a few more points to this picture. Along with these developments, I also see a unipolar world cultural order and unipolar
world information system — a flow of values and information
from the center to the periphery.
With Professor Sakamoto’s analysis as a backdrop, I will confine my remarks to how some of these issues, especially globalization, are playing out in Turkey.
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II. Turkey and Globalization
As a Turkish journalist, I feel that we are at the very center of the
clash between national identity and globalism. Actually, being a
country situated at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, the Balkans,
and the Middle East, we have always had a problem of identity.
It is a place where not only the geography of the East and West
meet but also the minds and mentalities; sometimes they compromise, sometimes they conflict.
The collapse of the Soviet Union as a whole had a very special
influence in Turkey in addition to the issues and discussions it
raised on a global scale. This drastic event has caused us to
rediscover our history, redefine our Turkish identity, and reformulate our traditional international position and role.
As is known, Turkey is a Muslim society and 99 percent of the
population is Muslim. Professor Bernard Lewis states that
Turkey is the only democratic and secular Islamic state among
the fifty-one members of the International Islamic Conference. I
feel Turkey is a special case and a unique model that demonstrates the failures and successes of an Islamic community’s
attempt to adopt modernist values.
If Turkey has responded positively to the question of compatability of Islam and democracy, the country is still, according
to Samuel Huntington, an important actor in a possible clash
between Christian Euro-American culture and Islam in the
twenty-first century. Contrary to Huntington, however, I
believe Turkey’s role in such an eventuality is not predetermined. We all know that a clash between Islam and Christianity
is not something new; for a very long time, the Turks have been
the sword of Islam against the West, especially during the reign
of the Ottoman Empire.
But it is also a fact that the bureaucratic and military elite of
Turkey, who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923 under the
leadership of Kemal Atatürk on the debris of the Ottoman
Empire, made a very deliberate choice for Westernization and
westward political orientation. In the new republic, the Ottoman
heritage and history were almost completely rejected; and thorough social, political, and economic Westernization reforms
were immediately adopted. In this sense, the Turkish road to
Westernization constitutes a unique example within the entire
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Islamic community. The reason was simple. The West was obviously becoming more and more powerful; consequently, to
regain the glory days of the past, Turkey had to adopt Western
ways. Basically, the reforms have been quite succesful, and
Turkey has made great strides, relative to its condition and to
other Islamic nations.
During the Cold War period, the young Republic of Turkey
became an ally of the West against communism and the USSR,
with whom she shared a border. As a member of NATO, Turkey
followed a very cautious, modest, Western-oriented foreign policy. Being a “late-starter” in modernization, Turkey relied heavily upon the state to create an entrepreneurial industrial class.
This was not smooth. The military intervened three times.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the import substituting and
protective Turkish economy had to go through a process of
structural change to become a more liberalized market economy. To a certain extent, this was a successful change; Turkey
had the highest rate of growth in recent years among the OECD
countries. But, in return, the social and political cost has been
very high —a cost that will continue to be paid for some time.
With the full penetration of the capitalist world market economy, our own traditional social and economic values are being
seriously damaged. The rich are becoming richer and highly
integrated into the new global economy while the poor get
poorer and the large middle class, the foundation of the republican values, has shrunk.
During this period, what used to be a slow flow of migration
from rural to urban areas became a flood. The migrants came
with values and beliefs that the urban culture was too weak and
disorganized to accommodate. As a result, traditional values
and severe economic impoverishment among many in urbanized Turkey have pushed political attitudes in a conservative
and alarmingly reactionary direction.
As a reflection of these circumstances, Turkey held local elections in March of 1994. The results were shocking. The Islamic
fundamentalist Welfare Party, for the first time in modern history, won in Istanbul and the capital city of Ankara, the symbols
of secularism. Moreover, the fundamentalists also took most of
the inland cities, which had been negatively affected by the
recent liberal economic changes.
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Finally, a year prior to these elections there was an ugly
episode that signaled the coming of great internal tension in
Turkey. In a central Anatolian town that once had a very progressive role in the foundation of the republic, fundamentalists
announced their presence by burning to the ground a hotel
housing visiting intellectuals. Thirty-seven of them lost their
lives. At the moment, many are watching with apprehension the
actions of the fundamentalists in power, hoping they will be
replaced through democratic action. The stakes are high in
Turkey and the central questions include: Who will win — the
globalized elites or the marginalized masses? Could there be a
middle-of-the-road solution based on a just, democratic, and
secular state in a modern society? What about issues of economic fairness and social justice?
While all of this was taking place inside Turkey—the symptoms of a new world disorder—the Bosnian and Armenian/Azerbaijani conflicts broke out. Both were presented as
religious wars, and the powerful West did nothing to stop the
slaughtering of Muslims. These international developments
reinforced the claims of the nonsecular groups. In addition to
these events, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a new situation — the liberation of the Turkic republics of Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. This
was good news in Turkey. Suddenly, there appeared a Turkish
existence from the Balkans to China. In the wake of this development, a new debate about Turkey’s role in the region and the
new world has commenced. Among the ideas on the front page
is the creation of a pan-Turkic zone with a sense of its own fate
and no longer an adjunct to others.
III. Conclusion
I agree with Professor Sakamoto on the need to restructure the
United Nations. As a member of the developing world, I believe
the potential of the new epoch can be captured only if multiculturalism becomes the defining feature of transnational life and
institutions. I have to say that, in Turkey, after seventy years of
conscious modernization, we are dismayed by vulgar and orientalist stereotypical questions such as: Do women still wear veils
in Turkey? Do men marry four women? I must also add that,
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although we tried hard, neither Western governments nor Western people see us as a part of an evolving modern world;
instead, they dismiss us as an alien culture good only for economic exploitation and military alliance. I am not an Islamic
fundamentalist, rather the very product of the Westernization of
my country. However, I have resentments toward the West that
coincide with the Islamic fundamentalist criticism of the West.
Let me end by saying a few words about the future relations
between the Islamic and Christian worlds. It is crucial to resist
demonization of each other. The responsibility for this, in my
opinion, lies primarily with the people of both civilizations and
the media. So far, there is a great deal of misrepresentation and
sheer ignorance on both sides. I feel very uncomfortable with
the media coverage of Islam in the U.S. which is caricatured by
the repetitive images of dark-bearded and deranged militants,
women in veils, and an inert mass of illiterate and backward
peoples. There is no gainsaying that these elements form a part
of reality, but they do not do justice to a more complex history
or contemporary life. Islam has its own high culture, conception
of human rights, equality of sexes, and a very deep humanistic
approach. Discovering the virtues that great civilizations of the
world share and becoming alive to them, while minimizing the
divisive, are key to envisaging a new world order worthy of
global civic life.
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